New tariffs have been set on MEWPs imported to the EU from China following an anti-subsidy investigation by the European Commission, while previously imposed  anti-dumping duties have been amended. 

The Berlaymont building - headquaters of the European Commission (Image: Andrzej via AdobeStock - stock.adobe.com)

The anti-subsidy investigation began in March 2024, following a complaint by industry group Coalition to Restore a Level Playing Field, formed by a consortium of companies based in the EU, which also kick-started the anti-dumping case.

The latest tariffs come on the back of on manufacturers based in China, which have now been ammended in light of the results of the subsidy investigation to prevent 鈥榙ouble counting鈥�, or overlapping of duties.

Both sets of duties apply to self propelled lifts, including articulated and telescopic booms, scissor lifts and vertical masts, with a maximum working height of 6m or more.

They also apply to pre-assembled or ready-to-assemble sections, including chassis, turrets or turntables, platforms and lifting mechanisms. They exclude individual components when sold separately, and all vehicle mounted aerial lifts.

Subsidy investigation 

The anti-subsidy enquiry analysed the potential way the Chinese state can aid manufacturers in exports specifically to the EU. The Commission noted, 鈥渂usinesses in China operate in a specific environment which 鈥� unlike the Western economies where market forces represent the dominant organizing principle 鈥� features numerous mechanisms that provide the Government of China (GOC) with substantial degree of control over any aspect of the economic activity in the country.

鈥淭his tight control prevents economic operators from acting as rational market operators seeking to maximise profits, and in fact forces them to act as an arm of the government in implementing its policies and plans.鈥�

The Commission added, 鈥淐hina鈥檚 financial system remains dominated by the banking sector and the state controls the banking sector through ownership, as well as through personal ties.鈥�

The Commission concluded that China-based producers benefited unfairly, to different degrees, from financing through loans and other financial means. 

鈥楩inancial benefits鈥�

As part of its investigation the Commission looked into the financial situation of a sample group of OEMs in terms of their liquidity and solvency risks compared to the financial support they have received, including, for example, bonds with an interest rate below the level that should have been expected.

鈥淥nly investors having motivations other than a financial return on their investment, such as compliance with the legal obligation to provide financing to companies in encouraged industries, would make such an investment.鈥�

The Commission concluded that exporting producers benefited from preferential financing in the form of credit lines, bank acceptance drafts and bonds; 鈥淚n view of this, the Commission considered these types of preferential financing a countervailable subsidy.鈥�

Double counting 

To avoid double counting of subsidy and dumping duties, the Commission deducted the subsidy amount from the dumping margin. However, the CCCME (China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products) claimed double counting still existed anti-dumping duties already offset some subsidies. It also argued that non-sampled companies received artificially high dumping margins. 

In response, representatives from the European industry opposed the Commission鈥檚 reduction of dumping duties by all subsidies, arguing some subsidies, like grants, tax breaks, and electricity preferences, were not included in the dumping calculation.

The Commission acknowledged that law permits combining anti-dumping and countervailing duties under certain conditions, but as the evidence came too late in the process, the Commission could not verify it in time. It added that the issue could be revisited in the future.  

Definitive countervailing duty:

1. For non-cooperating companies, the Commission applied the highest duty rate from cooperating sampled firms.
2. For cooperating non-sampled companies, average rates from the sample were used.

Annex I 

• Lingong Heavy Machinery Co
• Terex (Changzhou) Machinery
• XCMG Fire Fighting Safety Equipment
• Haulotte Access Equipment Manufacturing
• Fronteq (Changzhou) Machinery
• Jiangsu Liugong Machinery
• Hangcha Group
• Shandong Chufeng Heavy Industry Machinery
• Mantall Heavy Industry
• Jinan Juxin Machinery
• Shandong Yuntian Intelligent Machinery Equipment

Annex II

• Reeslift
• Shandong Qiyun Group
• Sunward Intelligent Equipment

Annex III

• Zhejiang Noblelift Equipment Joint Stock